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Copyright to the Rescue: Should Copyright Protect 
Privacy? 
 
Deidré A. Keller 
 
[T]he claim that lies beneath the notion of intellectual property is similar or identical to the one 
that underpins notions of privacy. . . . [T]he need we have to be able to do something by 




In the summer of 2015 amidst the beginnings of the 2016 presidential campaign,3 historic 
Supreme Court decisions,4 and regular reports of protests,5 some might have missed the copyright 
angle to the Ashley Madison story.  In fact, many may have missed the Ashley Madison story 
altogether.  It is worth retelling, in brief, because it highlights the question with which this article 
is concerned – to what extent should copyright protect privacy. 
In the summer of 2015, Ashley Madison, a website that bills itself as “The Original 
Extramarital Affairs Site”6 the tagline for which was, “Life is Short, Have An Affair,”7 was 
hacked.8  The e-mail addresses and credit card information of its 37 million users were accessed 
                                                          
2 NICK HARKAWAY, THE BLIND GIANT: BEING HUMAN IN A DIGITAL WORLD 128 (2012). 
3 Nicholas Confessore et al., Presidential Race Just Starting? Not According to the Spending, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/us/presidential-race-just-started-not-according-to-the-spending.html; 
Peggy Noonan, The 2016 Contest Begins to Take Shape, WALL STREET J. (July 17, 2015, 6:15 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-2016-contest-begins-to-take-shape-1437089919. 
4 Robert Barnes, Affordable Care Act Survives Supreme Court Challenge, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/obamacare-survives-supreme-court-
challenge/2015/06/25/af87608e-188a-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling 
Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html.    
5 Wale Aliyu, Police Pepper Spray Crowd After “Black Lives Matter” Conference, USA TODAY (July 27, 2015, 
8:01 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/07/27/police-pepper-spray-cleveland/30722441/; 
Howard Blume & Kate Mather, Black Lives Matter Activists Charged in Fracas at Event, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 
2015, 8:56 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-black-lives-matter-activists-charged-20150629-
story.html; Sam Frizell, Sanders and O’Malley Stumble During Black Lives Matter Protest, TIME (July 18, 2015), 
http://time.com/3963692/bernie-sanders-martin-omalley-black-lives-matter/; Nicole Norfleet, St. Paul Black Lives 
Matter Group Pushes Ahead With State Fair Protest Plans, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 28, 2015, 10:55 AM), 
http://www.startribune.com/st-paul-black-lives-matter-group-pushes-ahead-with-state-fair-protest-plans/323173881.    
6 ASHLEYMADISON.COM, https://www.ashleymadison.com/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2015).  
7 See, e.g., Chris Mills, AshleyMadison Confirms Hack, Purges Leaked Info from Internet, GIZMODO (July 20, 2015, 
9:43 PM), http://gizmodo.com/hackers-threaten-to-expose-40-million-cheating-ashleyma-1718965334/1719170821.  
The tagline “Life Is Short, Have an Affair” is even trademarked, with U.S. registration number 3745718.  
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF.,  
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=3745718&caseSearchType=US_APPLICATION&caseType=DEFAULT&searc
hType=statusSearch (last visited Sept. 1, 2016). 




and downloaded.9  The hackers, who called themselves The Impact Group, posted a sample of the 
information they obtained online along with a manifesto threatening to post all of Ashley 
Madison’s users’ sensitive information unless the site was taken down.10  Predictably, the site was 
not taken down and The Impact Group made good on its threat.11   
 
Following the hack, the owner of Ashley Madison, Avid Life Media (“Avid”),12 promptly 
issued a statement acknowledging the breach and assuring its subscribers that Avid would make 
sure the leaked information would be removed from the internet.13  A number of websites where 
the hacked content had been posted acquiesced to Avid’s demands.14  The tool Avid used to 
accomplish the seemingly impossible task of having information removed from the internet was 
the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (“DMCA”) takedown provision.15 
 
Avid’s use of the DMCA takedown procedure poses a number of interesting questions. 
Those addressed contemporaneously by legal commentators focused primarily on the doctrinal 
questions of whether: (1) the content in question was copyrightable and (2) Avid should be 
considered the author or copyright owner of that content, for purposes of the DMCA.16  This piece, 
on the other hand, considers the normative question of whether copyright ought to protect privacy 
interests in scenarios like the Ashley Madison hack or, more broadly, whether the Copyright Act 
has a role to play in the protection of privacy.  
 
While some courts have held that “[i]t is universally recognized . . . that the protection of 
privacy is not the function of our copyright law,”17 the remedies afforded copyright owners make 
pursuing copyright claims an attractive option to privacy plaintiffs.18  Copyright remedies include 
                                                          
9 Id. 
10 James Temperton, Hackers Threaten 37 Million AshleyMadison “Cheaters” with Exposure, WIRED UK (July 20, 
2015), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ashley-madison-hacked. 
11 Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2015, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/.  
12 Note that the owner has since changed its name to Ruby Corp. See, Erik Larson, Adultery Site Ashley Madison 
Puts Hacking Affair Behind It, Bloomberg Law (December 14, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/adultery-site-ashley-
madison-puts-hacking-affair-behind-it/. 
13 Mills, supra note 7. 
14 Hope King, Ashley Madison Tries to Stop the Spread of Its Leaked Data, CNN MONEY (August 21, 2015, 5:14 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/21/technology/ashley-madison-dmca-requests/.  
15  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2012) (insulating service providers from liability upon good faith removal of allegedly 
infringing material); Jeff John Roberts, In Ashley Madison Hack, Copyright “Solution” Is Worse Than No Solution, 
FORTUNE (July 21, 2015, 1:30 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/21/in-ashley-madison-hack-copyright-solution-is-
worse-than-no-solution/; see also, Joseph Cox, Ashley Madison Sent Me a DMCA Request for Tweeting Two Cells 
of a Spreadsheet, MOTHERBOARD (August 15, 2015), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/ashley-madison-sent-me-
a-dmca-request-for-tweeting-two-cells-of-a-spreadsheet. 
16 See, e.g., Stephen Carlisle, The Ashley Madison Hack: Why is a Website for Cheating Spouses Sending Out 
Dubious DMCA Notices?, NOVA SOUTHEASTERN U. (July 23, 2015), http://copyright.nova.edu/ashley-madison-
hack/ (“The facts aggregated by [Avid Dating Life] are purely the result of who signs up for the service, and who 
has removed themselves from the database by deleting their account. In other words, the facts have self-selected 
themselves.”). 
17 See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 





the removal of digital copies from the internet and the destruction of physical copies.19  The extent 
to which copyright ought to protect privacy interests has been considered in various jurisdictions 
recently20 but has not been treated comprehensively by contemporary legal scholars in the United 
States.21  This piece seeks to undertake that treatment.   
 
Part II of this paper begins this consideration by discussing two cases in which plaintiffs 
asserted copyright claims in addition to privacy allegations, though the underlying injuries were 
clearly primarily privacy-based.  Part III provides a brief overview of the current state of privacy 
law.  Part IV then considers the theoretical and jurisprudential overlap between privacy and 
copyright, and highlights the problems presented by protecting privacy through copyright.  Part 
IV also suggests two relatively modest legislative solutions:  (1) a limited federal statute that would 
provide a plaintiff alleging online privacy infringement with a remedy analogous to the DMCA’s 
takedown provisions available to those alleging online copyright infringement; and (2) statutorily 
adopting the moral right of disclosure already recognized in other countries in order to codify the 
common law right of first publication.22  Finally, Part V concludes by returning to the Ashley 
Madison example to consider the potential of the proposed solutions to address the problems 
presented. 
 
II.    Recent Privacy Cases Brought Under the Guise of Copyright Claims 
 
While Americans tend to speak of rights in absolute terms,23 it is clear that all rights are 
not created equal.  One of the most important theoretical contributions of the legal realists is the 
understanding that remedies are “constitutive components” of rights.24  It is impossible to 
understand the scope and substance of a stated right without understanding the remedies that may 
follow infringement of that right.25  Therefore, understanding why a plaintiff seeking to stop the 
dissemination of a particular work might proceed under a copyright theory rather than, or in 
addition to, a privacy theory, requires a basic understanding of the available remedies and the 
relative ease and promptness of halting dissemination under each paradigm.   
 
None of the four privacy torts effectively address the concerns raised by plaintiffs who 
assert copyright to defend privacy interests.  This is so, at least in part, because the remedies for 
privacy tort liability pale in comparison to the remedies available for copyright infringement.  The 
                                                          
19 17 U.S.C. §§ 503, 512 (2012). 
20 See infra part IV.C. 
21 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Protecting Privacy Through Copyright Law?, PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE 
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 191, 198 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015) (“Whether courts should allow copyright 
claims to protect personal interests in cases such as these is a question left to another day.”).  See also Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 557–
64 (2015) (considering cases in which privacy and reputational interests are actually at stake in copyright litigation).  
22 For a discussion of copyright as a moral right, see Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, 1 TEXAS A&M L. REV. 873 
(2014).   
23 See, generally, MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (The Free 
Press 1991). 
24 HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 148 
(2013) (“Situating remedies at the core of our understanding of rights, that is, perceiving remedies as constitutive 





Copyright Act provides definite and substantial statutory remedies.26  These include damages of 
up to $30,000 or $150,000 in cases in which willful infringement can be demonstrated.27  In 
addition, the plaintiff may be entitled to injunctive relief.28 Moreover, the prevailing party in an 
action for copyright infringement may also be awarded substantial attorney’s fees and costs.29  In 
light of these statutory remedies, the DMCA’s takedown procedure can be a highly effective tool.30  
It provides sites that host content with a safe harbor against claims of copyright infringement so 
long as they diligently aid copyright owners in removing infringing content from the sites.31  Given 
the potential alternative of expensive copyright litigation and the significant potential damages that 
may be awarded, internet service providers are very motivated to act in accordance with the wishes 
of copyright owners. 
 
On the other hand, the remedies for invasion of privacy are far from definite.  The right to 
privacy tort is governed by state law and the available remedies vary from state to state.32  
Finally, nothing like the immediate relief the DMCA provides is readily available through a 
lawsuit for invasion of privacy.  A privacy plaintiff’s best-case scenario is to file a lawsuit with 
the hopes of obtaining a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction early in the 
litigation.  Given the vagaries in privacy law amongst the states, this is far from certain.  Internet 
Service Providers and other potential defendants are therefore not nearly as likely to take the 
requests of a privacy plaintiff seriously. 
 
Terry Bollea’s dispute with Gawker highlights some of the problems a privacy plaintiff 
seeking to halt dissemination, particularly online, might encounter that a plaintiff proceeding under 
a copyright theory would not.33  The Bollea / Gawker dispute arose in 2012 when Gawker posted 
approximately 100 seconds of video footage in which Mr. Bollea is seen having sex with a woman. 
At the time the footage was shot, both Mr. Bollea and the woman in the video were married to 
other people.34  After filing suit in federal court alleging copyright infringement, and then dropping 
that suit,35 Bollea filed suit in Florida State Court.  Although the jury in Bollea’s state court action 
                                                          
26 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). 
27 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2102). 
28 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). 
29 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).  See also Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting 
that the District Court had awarded Defendant nearly $3 million in attorney’s fees and costs.). 
30 See, e.g., Maryanne Stanganelli, The DMCA Through the “Lenz” of Fair Use: The Ninth Circuit Finds Fair Use 
Analysis Required Before Sending a DMCA Takedown Notice, IP INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ipintelligencereport.com/2015/09/15/the-dmca-through-the-lenz-of-fair-use-the-ninth-circuit-finds-fair-
use-analysis-required-before-sending-a-dmca-takedown-notice/. 
31 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
32 See, e.g., Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def. Ch. 4(V)-E; 14 N.Y.Prac., New York Law of Torts § 
1:66; 21 Fla. Prac., Elements of an Action § 1503:1 (2015-16 ed.). 
33 Terry Bollea is the former professional wrestler better known as Hulk Hogan.  See, Complaint. at 6-8, Bollea v. 
Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F.Supp.2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 8:12–02348–T–27TBM, Dkt. 1). 
34 See, e.g., Dan Good, Janelle Irwin, and Leonard Greene, Hulk Hogan takes the stand in $100M sex tape trial, says 
mean wife drove him to romp with pal’s spouse, N.Y. Daily News (Mach 7, 2016), available online at 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/hulk-hogan-takes-stand-100m-lawsuit-gawker-article-1.2555554. 
35 Notice of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice (December 28, 2012), Bollea, 913 




ultimately awarded Bollea $115,000,000 in compensatory damages36 and $25,000,000 in punitive 
damages,37 none of Bollea’s pleas for injunctive relief succeeded.38   
 
If Bollea owned the copyright in the video at the time that Gawker posted the clip, Bollea and 
Gawker may never have ended up in court in the first place.  The Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act provides a ready remedy for copyright owners who find their content improperly posted 
online.39  The Bollea narrative demonstrates the attractiveness of proceeding under a copyright 
theory to a plaintiff who alleges her privacy has been infringed online.  However, the appeal of a 
copyright claim to a plaintiff with privacy concerns is in no way limited to online conduct. Hill v. 
Public Advocate of the United States demonstrates the potential advantages of copyright claims in 
cases where dissemination occurs entirely offline.40 
 
The plaintiffs in Hill were two men who posted their engagement pictures online, and their 
photographer friend, who took the pictures.41  The defendants were various individuals and entities 
responsible for the production and dissemination of a political campaign flyer that utilized one of 
the engagement photographs in connection with campaigns against various candidates for public 
office whom, it was asserted, were supportive of rights for gay people.42  Below is the original 
photograph alongside one of the flyers: 
 
                                                          
36 Nick Madigan and Ravi Somaiya, Hulk Hogan Awarded $115 Million in Privacy Suit Against Gawker, N.Y. 
Times (March 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-
verdict.html?_r=0. (Note well that the Florida state court case that resulted in this tremendous award was initiated 
after the voluntary dismissal of the federal case including a copyright claim. The federal case is discussed infra notes 
247, 248 and 252 and accompanying text.) 
37 Paul Callan, Hulk Hogan Verdict body-slams Gawker, CNN (March 22, 2016), available online at 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/20/opinions/hulk-hogan-verdict-warning-shot-media-opinion-callan/. 
38 The Federal District Court rejected the request for injunctive relief.  See, Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1328 
(“Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief is due to be denied because he has produced no evidence 
demonstrating that he will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction.”).  The Florida Court of Appeals 
reversed the Circuit Court decision to grant a temporary injunction.  See also, Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 
So. 3d 1196, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2014) (“Because the temporary injunction is an unconstitutional prior 
restraint under the First Amendment, we reverse.”). 
39  17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in 
subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the 
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider, if the service provider . . . upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the 
subject of infringing activity.”). 
40 Hill v. Public Advocate of the U.S., 35 F.Supp.3d 1347 (D. Colo. 2014). 
41 Id. at 1351. 






The plaintiffs filed suit in District Court in Colorado alleging misappropriation of the likenesses 
of the pictured plaintiffs, as well as infringement of the photographer’s copyright.43  The District 
Court of Colorado interpreted the photographed couple’s claims as privacy allegations and 
dismissed those claims on First Amendment grounds.44 Conversely, the defendants’ asserted fair 
use argument failed to overcome the photographer plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim.45  The 
parties settled shortly after the Court’s ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss.46  
 
While Hill and Bollea demonstrate why a plaintiff with privacy concerns might proceed 
under a copyright theory, this paper is more interested in whether courts ought to entertain 
copyright allegations in those circumstances.  This question has received brief consideration lately, 
with particular attention paid to potential First Amendment concerns.47 While this paper will touch 
briefly on these concerns,48 its particular focus will be on two problems not yet addressed in the 
literature.  First, seeking to vindicate the privacy rights of subjects through the current copyright 
regime is complicated and perhaps inappropriate because copyright is fully alienable and as such, 
the copyright owner of a particular work is often neither the subject, nor the author, of the work.49  
Second, courts considering privacy issues under the guise of copyright claims have a propensity 
to perceive a constitutional privacy issue where the facts only support a tort claim.  
 
What follows immediately is a brief overview of the history and development of the right 
to privacy in the United States, which will demonstrate two important points. First, tort privacy 
and constitutional privacy are distinct rights—the first a right against other individuals, the second, 
                                                          
43 Id. at 1351. 
44 Id. at 1354, 1357. 
45 Id. at 1360 (“the Plaintiffs' have stated a plausible copyright infringement claim . . . and I DENY Public Advocate 
and the Defendants' Motions To Dismiss . . . to the extent they seek dismissal of the Plaintiffs' copyright 
infringement claim based on the fair use doctrine.”). 
46 Notice of Settlement, Hill, 35 F.Supp.3d 1347 (No. 12–02550–WYD–KMT, Dkt. 149); see also, Caitlin Gibson, 
Case against advocacy group tied to Loudon County supervisor ends in settlement, WASH. POST (June 19, 2014), 
available online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/case-against-advocacy-group-tied-to-
loudoun-county-supervisor-ends-in-settlement/2014/06/19/e6ea1b1e-f7cc-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html 
(July 22, 2016). 
47 See, e.g., Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright and the 
First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2016). 
48 Section IV infra. 




a right against the government. Second, privacy is personal; that is to say, it is an inalienable right 
that belongs to individuals. 
 
III. Privacy Law, In Brief 
A. General Principles 
 
Warren and Brandeis described privacy as a nascent concept in the common law, which 
they conceived of as a “right to be let alone.”50 Warren and Brandeis’ article, The Right to Privacy 
has recently been hailed as “the most influential of all law review articles.”51  At the time Warren 
and Brandeis were writing, no court of last resort in the United States had yet recognized a common 
law right to privacy.52  In fact, it wasn’t until fifteen years after The Right to Privacy was penned 
that the Georgia State Supreme Court would become the first court of last resort in the United 
States to recognize the right to privacy.53  It would take another sixty years for the United States 
Supreme Court to recognize a constitutional right to privacy.54  Today, the right to privacy is 
widely recognized by state statute and common law,55 and is constitutionally protected against 
governmental intrusion.56   
 
Since Warren and Brandeis wrote The Right to Privacy, some general principles regarding 
the right to privacy have emerged. Chief among these for the purposes of this article are the 
personal nature of the right to privacy, and the development of two distinct strands of 
jurisprudence: (1) state law articulating the privacy tort as a matter of state statutory law and 
common law; and (2) federal law enunciating a constitutional right to be free from governmental 
interference.   
                                                          
50 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). On the poetic 
license Warren and Brandeis are utilizing here, see Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
1187, 1190 (“Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as the ‘right to be let alone,’ a phrase adopted from Judge 
Thomas Cooley's famous treatise on torts in 1880.  Cooley's right to be let alone was, in fact, a way of explaining 
that attempted physical touching was a tort injury; he was not defining a right to privacy.”). 
51 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
1503 (2012). 
52 RICHARD A. GLENN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:  RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW, 56 (ABC-CLIO, Inc. 
2003). 
53 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386-88 (1960). 
54 Anita L. Allen, The Natural Law, Slavery, and the Right to Privacy Tort, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1187, 1199 
(2012). 
55 See ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 77 (2001) (“It is true that most states now 
permit recovery of damages for some types of invasion of personal privacy.  Minnesota joined the pack in 1998, 
leaving North Dakota and Wyoming as the only two states whose courts have never recognized privacy as a cause of 
action.”). 
56 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989) (“This Article is about the 
constitutional right to privacy, a right that many believe has little to do with privacy and nothing to do with the 
Constitution.  By all accounts, however, the right to privacy has everything to do with delineating the legitimate 
limits of governmental power.  The right to privacy, like the natural law and substantive due process doctrines for 
which it is a late-blooming substitute, supposes that the very order of things in a free society may on certain 




i. Privacy is Personal 
 
The first court of last resort in the United States to recognize a right to privacy made clear 
that the right to privacy is personal, belonging to particular individuals.  The Georgia State 
Supreme Court in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. stated, “[t]he right of privacy, or the right 
of the individual to be let alone, is a personal right. . . .  It is the complement of the right to the 
immunity of one's person.”57  In initially theorizing the right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis   
spoke of the right of “each individual . . . [to] determin[e], ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, 
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”58  In articulating the constitutional 
right to privacy, the Supreme Court agreed that this is, in fact, a personal right.59  The right to 
privacy is inalienable.  That is to say, invasions of the right to privacy can only be vindicated in a 
suit by the individual whose privacy has been invaded.60  Relatedly, corporate entities do not enjoy 
a right to privacy under either tort theory or constitutional theory.61 
ii. The Privacy Tort and the Constitutional Right to Privacy are Distinct 
 
Although the right of privacy tort and the constitutional right to be free from governmental 
intrusions have similar theoretical underpinnings, as one commentator notes, these two types of 
privacy are “categorically” distinct.62  “Certain privacy encroachments stem from the actions of 
private individuals, and other privacy encroachments result from intrusive governmental action. 
The first type of privacy encroachment . . . [is] tort privacy.”63  On the other hand, “[c]onstitutional 
privacy has come to mean the right of the individual to be free from unwanted and unwarranted 
governmental intrusion in matters affecting fundamental rights.”64  The Supreme Court recognized 
this in Katz v. U.S., stating, “the protection of a person's general right to privacy—his right to be 
let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to 
the law of the individual States.”65  The Court also stated:  “the Constitution protect[s] personal 
privacy from . . . governmental invasion.”66  The remainder of this Section addresses constitutional 
privacy and tort privacy, in turn. 
 
B. Constitutional Protections 
 
The constitutional right to privacy was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold 
v. Connecticut in 1965.67  To properly understand the myriad ways in which the Constitution 
protects privacy and the ways in which those protections are related to each other and to the privacy 
                                                          
57 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78 (Ga. 1905).  
58 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 198 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
59 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
60 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. 
RES. 647, 667 (1991). 
61 Restatement (Second) of Torts §652I, comment c (“A corporation, partnership or unincorporated association has 
no personal right of privacy.”).   
62 GLENN, supra note 52, at 5. 
63 Id. (emphasis in original). 
64 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
65 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (internal citations omitted). 
66 Id. at 350 (emphasis added). 




tort,68 we must consider a line of Supreme Court decisions that includes Griswold, but neither 
begins nor ends there.  Interestingly, Brandeis, whose article first articulated the right to privacy 
tort, also figures prominently in the narrative of the constitutional right to privacy.69   
 
What follows is a brief treatment of the Constitution’s role in protecting privacy.70  The 
remainder of this section proceeds in four parts.  First, I will consider the concept of decisional 
privacy that developed from the Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, which is widely 
recognized as the first time the Supreme Court recognized a right to privacy.71  Next I will consider 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in which the concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
developed.  Then, I will consider the various ways in which the First Amendment protects privacy 
interests.  Finally, I conclude this section with a synopsis of these various constitutional privacy 
protections. 
  i. Decisional Privacy 
 
Sixty years after the Georgia Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy tort,72 the 
Supreme Court of the United States recognized the constitutional right to privacy.  In a splintered 
decision, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut73 held that although the Constitution does not 
                                                          
68 See, Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1357 (1992) (“Many commentators 
have attempted to sever the ‘expectation of privacy’ which has evolved in American jurisprudence under the Fourth 
Amendment, from the tort of privacy created by Warren and Brandeis in 1890, the ‘fundamental‑decision privacy’ 
later introduced in Griswold v. Connecticut, and other forms of privacy which have concurrently taken shape in 
American law. Such a sharp division is unfortunate, however, because history confirms that the various offshoots of 
privacy are deeply intertwined at the roots, owing their origins to the same soil.”). 
69 NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY, 7 (Oxford University Press 2015) (“Later in his life, [Brandeis] penned 
a second major contribution to privacy—his dissent in Olmstead v. United States.  This introduced modern concepts 
of privacy into constitutional law.  It led to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test governing Fourth 
Amendment law, and shaped the constitutional right to privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. 
Wade.”). 
70 Some of the privacy literature treats the development of constitutional privacy protections at the state level.  See, 
e.g., Timothy O. Lenz, ‘Rights Talk’ About Privacy in State Courts, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1613 (1997).  (Discussion of 
the interaction of state constitutional privacy protections and copyright is beyond the scope of this article.) 
71 See generally JOHN W. JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT: BIRTH CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
OF PRIVACY (University Press of Kansas 2005). 
72 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); see infra notes 141, 147-149.  
73 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (J. Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. There were three 
separate concurrences and a dissent.  The first concurrence, written by J. Goldberg and joined by C.J. Warren and J. 
Brennan was intended to “emphasize the relevance of [the Ninth] Amendment to the Court’s holding.”  The second, 
written by J. Harlan concurs in the judgment only.  Harlan would have based the decision not on the rights 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights or “any of their radiations” but, rather, on the “concept of ordered liberty. . . .”  The 
third concurrence was written by J. White.  It too concurs in the judgment only and locates the basis of the right 
claimed by Griswold in the Fourteenth Amendment.  White’s concurrence focuses on Connecticut’s failure to 
articulate a compelling state interest.  Finally Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart dissented.  Black and Stewart 
were wary of granting Constitutional protection to what they say had previously been understood as merely a tort:  
 
The phrase “right to privacy” appears first to have gained currency from an article written by Messrs. 
Warren and (later Mr. Justice) Brandeis in 1890 which urged that States should give some form of tort 
relief to persons whose private affairs were exploited by others.  Largely as a result of this article, some 
States have passed statutes creating such a cause of action, and in others state courts have done the same 




affirmatively articulate a right to privacy, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”74  
Within these penumbras, the Court identified a constitutional right to privacy that guarantees 
freedom from “governmental intrusion.”75   
 
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter penned the Court’s most descriptive articulation 
of the right to privacy in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,76 stating:  
 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Our 
cases recognize the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Our precedents have 
respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.  These 
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.77 
 
This line of constitutional privacy cases demonstrates that the Constitution recognizes a zone of 
privacy around individuals within which each individual must be free to make certain fundamental 
decisions without governmental intrusion.78  More recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,79 the Supreme 
                                                          
a cause of action for damages to a man whose picture had been used in a newspaper advertisement without 
his consent, said that “A right of privacy in matters purely private is . . . derived from natural law” and that 
“The conclusion reached by us seems to be . . . thoroughly in accord with natural justice, with the principles 
of the law of every civilized nation, and especially with the elastic principles of the common law . . . .”  
Observing that “the right of privacy . . . presses for recognition here,” today this Court, which I did not 
understand to have power to sit as a court of common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which 
Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the level of a constitutional rule which 
prevents state legislatures from passing any law deemed by this Court to interfere with “privacy.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
74 Id. at 484. 
75 Id. at 483 (emphasis added). 
76 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
77 Id. at 851 (internal citations omitted). 
78 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S 589, 599-600 (1977) (characterizing the right recognized in Roe v. Wade and its progeny 
as “independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”); GLENN, supra note 52, at 12; DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 31 (Harvard University Press 2009) (“[T]he Court has conceptualized the 
protection of privacy as the state’s noninterference in certain decisions that are essential to defining personhood.”); 
Id. at 166 (“Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe all protect against what I call ‘decisional interference’—that is, 
governmental interference with people’s decisions regarding certain matters in their lives.  These cases extend to 
decisions relating to sex and sexuality, as well as parent’s child-rearing decisions.”). 




Court overturned its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick80 and held that a Texas state law 
prohibiting sex between homosexuals was unconstitutional.81 
 
The line of cases stretching from Griswold to Lawrence demonstrates that within the 
constitutional zone of privacy are issues including, but certainly not limited to, contraception,82 
abortion,83 same-sex intercourse,84 and child-rearing.85  Griswold was the first Supreme Court 
decision to specifically articulate privacy as a constitutional right, and these privacy cases are the 
starting point for understanding constitutional privacy protections.86  However, Justice Brandeis 
actually planted the seed for the idea that there is a constitutional aspect to privacy in his dissent 
to the Court’s decision in Olmstead v. U.S.87  
  
  ii. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
 
In 1928, nearly forty years after co-authoring The Right to Privacy with Samuel Warren, 
Louis Brandeis was in his twelfth year as a Supreme Court Justice.88  That year, the Court heard 
Olmstead v. U.S.89 in which it was to decide whether wiretapping without a warrant violated a 
criminal defendant’s rights under the Constitution.90  The majority held that such wiretapping 
violated neither the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
nor the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination.91  Dissenting in Olmstead, 
Brandeis specifically called attention to the right to privacy.  Rejecting the majority’s narrow 
reading of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Brandeis said: 
 
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope. The 
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit 
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They 
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone – the most 
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect 
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
                                                          
80 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
81 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. 
82 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending the 
right recognized in Griswold to unmarried persons). 
83 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
84 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
85 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398-403 (1923). 
86 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 33 (1999). 
87 Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1295-96 (2010). 
88 See Melvin I. Urofsky, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Art of Judicial Dissent, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 919, 934-36 (2012). 
89 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
90 Id. at 455 (“[W]hether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and others, 
intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”) 




Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained 
by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.92 
 
Just as Warren and Brandeis conceived of the right to privacy in response to technological 
advances in photography,93 Brandeis based his reading of the privacy right into the Constitution 
on technological advances:  “Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have 
become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the 
Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in 
court of what is whispered in the closet.”94 
 
It would take nearly forty years, but ultimately, Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead would win 
the day in Katz v. U.S.,95 in which the Court held that warrantless wiretapping did indeed violate 
the Fourth Amendment.96  Recently, in Riley v. California,97 the Court further considered the 
Fourth Amendment in the context of newly-developed technology; specifically, cell phones.  In 
Riley, the Court held that warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone violated the Fourth 
Amendment.98  The Court stated:  “A search of the information on a cell phone bears little 
resemblance to the type of brief physical search [incident to arrest] . . . .”99  This Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence is primarily important to the analysis of the copyright / privacy overlap 
because it demonstrates the continuing importance of technological advancement in the 
development of privacy jurisprudence.  What follows is a brief discussion of the First 
Amendment’s role in protecting privacy interests. 
 
  iii. The First Amendment and Privacy 
  
The relationship between the First Amendment and privacy is complicated and 
multifaceted.100  The potential conflict between privacy and the First Amendment has been treated 
extensively in the literature.101  The most common form of conflict occurs where the First 
Amendment right to freedom of the press conflicts with an individual’s asserted privacy interest.102  
                                                          
92 Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis dissenting) (emphasis added). 
93 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded 
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the 
prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”). 
94 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473.  It is interesting to note how closely this language tracks the language from Warren & 
Brandeis, supra note 50. 
95 Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
96 Id. at 353 (“The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated 
the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and 
seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
97 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
98 Id. at 2494-95. 
99 Id. at 2485. 
100 See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 69; O’NEIL, supra note 55; Rubenfeld, supra note 56; Gormley, supra note 68. 
101 See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149 (2005); 
Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 139 (2001). 
102 See, e.g., Gary Wax, Popping Britney’s Personal Safety Bubble: Why Proposed Anti-Paparazzi Ordinances in 
Los Angeles Cannot Withstand First Amendment Scrutiny, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 133 (2009); Barry P. 
McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather 




This conflict relates to the pursuit of copyright infringement claims in factual scenarios that raise 
privacy questions.  As such, this article will address such conflict in Section IV, below.103  This 
section will now consider the extent to which the First Amendment’s protection of the right to 
freedom of speech may also be seen as protective of privacy.104 
 
The First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause is seen as protecting privacy in at least 
two distinct ways.  First, the First Amendment has been understood to encompass the right not to 
speak since as early as 1943.105 Courts have also long recognized the First Amendment interests 
of unwilling listeners.106     
 
In 1977, the Supreme Court of the United States, relying upon its decision in W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,107 declared, “[t]he right of freedom of thought . . . as guaranteed by the 
Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all.”108  Since then, “[f]or the most part, government attempts to force individuals 
to affirm beliefs contrary to their own . . . are subject to strict scrutiny and struck down.”109  In 
Wooley v. Maynard, the Court stated, “[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking 
are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”110  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Wooley affirmed the existence of the right not to speak 
while finding that the case at hand implicated no such right.111  The Chief Justice said:   
 
The State has not forced appellees to “say” anything, and it has not forced them to 
communicate ideas with nonverbal actions reasonably likened to “speech,” such as 
wearing a lapel button promoting a political candidate or waving a flag as a 
symbolic gesture.  The State has simply required that all noncommercial 
automobiles bear license tags with the state motto, “Live Free or Die.”  Appellees 
have not been forced to affirm or reject that motto; they are simply required by the 
State, under its police power, to carry a state auto license tag for identification and 
registration purposes.112 
 
Rehnquist’s dissent in Wooley demonstrates that while the Supreme Court was unanimous in 
recognizing that the right not to speak is inherent in the First Amendment’s freedom of speech 
                                                          
103 See infra notes 286 - 291 and accompanying text. 
104 Other scholars have considered how the freedom of association protected by the First Amendment is related to 
privacy.  See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and Empirically 
Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2014) (focusing on the freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press aspects of the First Amendment because those are the aspects that tend to overlap with copyright issues). 
105 See, e.g., Anna M. Taruschio, The First Amendment, the Right Not to Speak, and Government Access Statutes, 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1013 n.80 (2000) (characterizing the Court’s reasoning in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705, 714 (1977), as follows: “the First Amendment invalidates state efforts to coerce private speech.”). 
106 Roger C. Hartley, Freedom Not to Listen: A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory Indoctrination Through 
Workplace Captive Audience Meetings, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65 (2010). 
107 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
108 Id. at 645. 
109 Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (2014). 
110 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). 
111 Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 




clause, reasonable people may disagree on what constitutes an infringement of that right.113  For 
Rehnquist, in order for the right to be implicated the government must be compelling persons to 
communicate particular speech and the display of a state slogan on a license plate simply did not 
meet that criteria.114  A number of cases since Wooley have recognized the right not to speak.115  
Recent scholarly treatment of the First Amendment recognizes the public’s interest in being free 
from compelled disclosures.116 
 
In addition to protecting the “right not to speak,” the First Amendment is also seen as 
protecting the “right not to listen.”117  The right not to listen concept is understood as having 
developed out of a privacy interest.118  As such, what we might ordinarily understand as tort 
privacy seems to take on a “quasi-constitutional” aspect.119  Political or religious speech may lose 
its First Amendment protection because the intended audience is not willing to listen and that 
unwillingness trumps the protections that would normally be afforded to such speech.120 These 
cases present an interesting scenario in which one private party has allegedly invaded the First 
Amendment rights of another, and the court deems the interests at issue to be constitutional. 
     
While the concepts of the right not to speak and the right not to listen are well-established, 
recent scholarship considers the role of the First Amendment in intellectual privacy and 
informational privacy.  Neil Richards recently considered the concept of “intellectual privacy.”121  
Richards asserts that the First Amendment plays a role in creating a space for formulating and 
articulating ideas prior to or even in the absence of disseminating those ideas.122  Utilitarian theory 
supports this line of reasoning by specifically focusing upon the First Amendment’s role in 
protecting privacy as a necessary prerequisite to the development of political ideas and the 
resulting enhancement of political discourse.123  As articulated by Richards, intellectual privacy is 
important for analyzing the relationship between copyright and privacy because the development 
                                                          
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18-23 (2012) (collecting and 
analyzing cases). 
116 Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 352-53 (2008). 
117 Hartley, supra note 106, at 79-89 (tracing the development of the right not to listen in constitutional 
jurisprudence). 
118Id. at 85 (characterizing Frisby v. Schultz as a “paradigmatic example of the Court concluding that the unwilling 
listener's interest surmounts the speaker's free speech claims” and noting that in Frisby the Court was considering 
the constitutionality of an “ordinance [which] recited . . .[its] primary purpose as ‘the protection and preservation of 
the home’ through assurance ‘that members of the community enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-
being, tranquility, and privacy.’”). 
119 Gormley, supra note 68, at 1375 (“there are those cases in which privacy intersects with free speech -- for 
instance, where a door-to-door religious solicitor may seek to convey a message to an unwilling listener in the home. 
It is here, it will be argued, that privacy has evolved into a third species, quasi-constitutional in nature.”). 
120 Id.(“one person may have a right to knock on doors or deliver sermons through loudspeakers in the park -- 
arguably protected "speech" under the First Amendment -- but there is a competing notion of privacy inherent in the 
audience which at some point overtakes the free speech interest.”). 
121 RICHARDS, supra note 68. 
122 Id. 
123 This focus on the political is to be expected given the First Amendment’s particular solicitude for political 
speech.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on the 
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our 




of political ideas will likely produce copyrightable content.  Similarly, informational privacy, 
which is defined as “the right of the individual to control dissemination by the government of 
information concerning his or her person”124 concerns arguably copyrightable content.  
Interestingly, although the Supreme Court has thus far refused to protect informational privacy as 
a constitutional right,125 a number of scholars continue to advance it as an important concept in the 
digital age.126   
 
The First Amendment’s contributions to protecting privacy are important in understanding 
the extent to which copyright law ought to protect privacy.  The “right not to listen” is conceptually 
related to the ways in which copyright owners have asserted the First Amendment.  “Right not to 
listen” cases present scenarios in which an individual’s privacy interest is deemed superior to the 
asserted First Amendment rights of the putative speaker, although there appears to be no state 
action.127  Meanwhile, in Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v. The Nation Magazine, the Court 
relied on the “right not to speak” to protect privacy interests that had previously been protected by 
the right of first publication.128  Likewise, the concept of intellectual privacy is related to the 
production of copyrightable content and the concept of informational privacy deals directly with 
halting dissemination of content that may well be copyrightable. 
 
iv. Constitutional Privacy Protections: A Brief Wrap-Up   
 
The three constitutional protections that are most relevant to considering the extent to 
which copyright ought to protect privacy are decisional privacy, the Fourth Amendment 
conception of reasonable expectation of privacy, and the First Amendment freedom of speech 
privacy protections. Decisional privacy is important because it was the first constitutional right to 
privacy recognized by the Supreme Court.  Decisional privacy jurisprudence articulates the scope 
of the subject matter protected within the zone of privacy.  The Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” line of cases demonstrates how privacy jurisprudence has evolved in 
response to technological advancement.  The First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause has 
previously been asserted as protective of privacy interests in the context of copyright litigation.129  
Finally, intellectual privacy and informational privacy, though not previously considered in the 
                                                          
124 GLENN, supra note 52, at 13.  
125 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 651 (2007) (“But to this 
point, there has not been constitutional protection for informational privacy. The Supreme Court has considered 
informational privacy in a couple of contexts, under the Due Process Clause and under the First Amendment. In both 
areas, informational privacy has failed to receive a favorable reaction from the Supreme Court.”). 
126 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1373 (2000). 
127 See discussion infra Section IV.B.ii. 
128 Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1985) (“[C]ommon-law copyright was often 
enlisted in the service of personal privacy. . .. In its commercial guise, however, an author's right to choose when he 
will publish is no less deserving of protection.  The period encompassing the work's initiation, its preparation, and 
its grooming for public dissemination is a crucial one for any literary endeavor. The Copyright Act, which accords 
the copyright owner the "right to control the first public distribution" of his work, House Report, at 62, echos [sic] 
the common law's concern that the author or copyright owner retain control throughout this  critical stage.”(internal 
citations omitted)). 




context of copyright litigation, have to do with the creation and dissemination of potentially 
copyrightable content.  
  
Understanding each of these provides a foundation from which we may consider whether 
copyright’s potential contribution to privacy protection is more analogous to constitutional privacy 
protections or tort privacy protections.  The next section discusses the privacy tort.  This piece then 
turns to the copyright scholarship and cases taking up the relationship between privacy and 
copyright. 
C. The Invasion of Privacy Tort 
 
While Warren and Brandeis are viewed as the progenitors of tort privacy,130 Professor 
Prosser is credited with harmonizing the various cases in which the right to privacy developed.131  
The Restatement reflects Prosser’s categorization.132  It reads: 
 
The right of privacy is invaded by 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; or 
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.133  
The tort of invasion of privacy was first recognized by a court of last instance in Pavesich 
v. New England Life Ins. Co.,134 in which the Georgia State Supreme Court found New England 
Life Insurance Company liable for using a photograph of Pavesich in connection with an 
advertisement without Pavesich’s consent.135  Today, more than 110 years since Pavesich, the tort 
of invasion of privacy is recognized in the vast majority of American jurisdictions.136  The 
                                                          
130 Gormley, supra note 68, at 1341. 
131 Id. at 1341 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960)).  
132 Neil M. Richards and Daniel J. Solove, Prosser's Privacy at 50: A Symposium on Privacy in the 21st Century: 
Article: Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1887, 1903 (“Prosser's final source of influence 
over the development of tort privacy was in his role in the American Law Institute's revision of the 1934 
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version Prosser oversaw.” (citing Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy 
Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 887, 897 n.64 (2006) and Amy Gajda, Judging 
Journalism, The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1039, 1052 n.63 
(2009))(emphasis added). 
133 Restatement (Second) Torts §652A. 
134 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
135 Id. 
136 Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 1998) (Recognizing the invasion of privacy tort and 
noting that prior to its decision “[o]nly Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wyoming [had] not yet recognized any of the 




Pavesich decision warrants further consideration both for its conceptualization of the right it 
enunciated and because it has influenced the development of the right to privacy in other states.137 
 
The Pavesich Court framed the issue it was considering as “whether an individual has a 
right of privacy which he can enforce, and which the courts will protect against invasion.”138 In 
answering this question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized that it was 
making new law, meticulously discussed the state of existing law and stated the justifications for 
its holding.  In explaining its reasoning, the Pavesich Court called upon natural rights, saying: 
 
The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature.  It is recognized 
intuitively, consciousness being the witness that can be called to establish its 
existence.  Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once 
that as to each individual member of society there are matters private and there are 
matters public so far as the individual is concerned.  Each individual as instinctively 
resents any encroachment by the public upon his rights which are of a private nature 
as he does the withdrawal of those of his rights which are of a public nature.  A 
right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from natural law.  This 
idea is embraced in the Roman's conception of justice, which “was not simply the 
external legality of acts, but the accord of external acts with the precepts of the law, 
prompted by internal impulse and free volition.”139  
Later on in the decision, the Court brought together the concepts of property, assault, and privacy, 
saying: 
 
The individual has always been entitled to be protected in the exclusive use and 
enjoyment of that which is his own.  The common law regarded his person and 
property as inviolate, and he has the absolute right to be let alone.140  
 
This important maneuver bridged the gap between the right to be let alone in the context of assault, 
and the right to privacy that the Pavesich Court was pronouncing.141  The Court also called on 
prior precedent that relied upon property theories under similar factual circumstances.  The Court 
went on to consider the utilitarian justifications for a right to privacy.  It said: 
 
[A]s to certain matters the individual feels and knows that he has a right to exercise 
the liberty of privacy, and that he has a right to resent any invasion of this liberty, 
and, if the law will not protect him against invasion, the individual will, to protect 
himself and those to whom he owes protection, use those weapons with which 
                                                          
137 Jonathan Kahn, Controlling Identity: Plessy, Privacy, and Racial Defamation, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 756 
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140 Id. at 78. 
141 Given that Warren and Brandeis had relied upon Cooley’s articulation of the “right to be let alone” in the assault 





nature has provided him, as well as those which the ingenuity of man has placed 
within his reach.142   
 
The Pavesich Court expounded upon the utilitarian basis for recognizing a right to privacy, stating, 
“the peace and good order of society would be disturbed by each individual becoming a law unto 
himself to determine when and under what circumstances he should avenge the outrage which has 
been perpetrated upon him or a member of his family.”143  By engaging both natural rights and 
utilitarian theory, the Pavesich Court demonstrated both the need to recognize the right to privacy 
for the benefit of individuals and the public interest in recognizing that right.  Having articulated 
the theoretical bases for recognizing the right to privacy, the Pavesich Court went on to explain its 
choice to break with the existing jurisprudence, which emphasized property or contract theories. 
 
The Pavesich Court understood that by finding in the plaintiff’s favor it was recognizing a 
right that had not previously been articulated in American law.  The Court: 
 
conceded that prior to 1890 every adjudicated case . . . which might be said to have 
involved a right of privacy, was not based upon the existence of such right, but was 
founded upon a supposed right of property, or a breach of trust or confidence, or 
the like, and that therefore a claim to a right of privacy, independent of a property 
or contractual right . . . had, up to that time, never been recognized . . . . 144 
 
The Court criticized what it referred to as the “conservatism of the judiciary,”145 noting:  “[a]ny 
candid mind will, however, be compelled to concede that, in order to give relief in many of those 
cases, it required a severe strain to bring them within the recognized rules which were sought to 
be applied.”146 Finally, the Court noted, as Warren and Brandeis had,147 that technological 
advances made it more likely that one’s privacy would be invaded by an errant photographer.148 
 
Tort law regarding privacy has developed significantly since Warren and Brandeis 
conceptualized it and the Georgia Supreme Court first recognized it.  Still, Prosser’s categorization 
continues to represent the definitive word on the various iterations of the tort.149  The remainder 
of this section treats intrusion, public disclosure, false light, and misappropriation in turn.  
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442, 450 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J., dissenting))). 




Intrusion, public disclosure, and false light will be treated together as they bear a number of 
similarities.  Because misappropriation overlaps in some complicated ways with the right of 
publicity, this section concludes with a consideration of the similarities and differences between 
the two. 
 
Intrusion, public disclosure, and false light all require intentional acts that would be seen 
as highly offensive by a reasonable person.150  Moreover, each of these can be seen as overlapping 
with some previously existing tort.  For example, false light is often criticized, and some States 
have refused to recognize it,151 because it is seen as too similar to defamation.152  Finally, all three 
of these are thought to protect against mental anguish.153  Therefore, the remedies available are 
usually monetary damages aimed at compensating the plaintiff for mental harm suffered.154 
 
Unlike the first three privacy torts, misappropriation is seen as somewhat commercial in 
nature.155 That is to say, the interest protected by the misappropriation tort is not merely mental in 
nature.156  In harmonizing the privacy jurisprudence and distinguishing among the types of harms 
encompassed in the invasion of privacy cases, Prosser said, “[i]t seems sufficiently evident that 
appropriation is quite a different matter from intrusion, disclosure of private facts, or a false light 
in the public eye. The interest protected is not so much a mental as a proprietary one, in the 
exclusive use of the plaintiff's name and likeness as an aspect of his identity.”157 And, while some 
courts and scholars seek to separate the privacy tort of misappropriation from the right of 
publicity,158 others mix these categories in ways that make it difficult to tease apart the distinct 
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claims, interests, and available remedies.159 For the purposes of this paper the important difference 
between the right to publicity and misappropriation as encompassed in some definitions of the 
invasion of privacy tort is that the right of publicity is generally seen in many jurisdictions as fully 
alienable.160  
 
In cases that raise both privacy and copyright claims, copyright claims often persist past 
the dismissal of privacy claims. This article considers whether courts ought to entertain alternative 
copyright claims when privacy concerns are at the heart of the alleged harm. What follows in Part 
IV is a discussion of the relationship between privacy and copyright, the problems that arise when 
copyright is deployed to protect privacy, and potential solutions to those problems.   
 
IV. The Copyright / Privacy Nexus 
 
 In order to fully consider whether copyright should protect privacy, it is important to first 
consider the theory underpinning both regimes. To the extent that the theoretical commitments of 
each are irreconcilable, it is difficult to see how copyright might protect privacy interests. As 
copyright and privacy have a long history of interconnectedness, considering the scholarship and 
jurisprudence articulating those connections is vital. The Section that follows considers that 
theory and history and then moves on to consider the problems posed by seeking to protect 
privacy through copyright; specifically, copyright’s misfit for protecting privacy, a personal 
right, and the potential for courts to misconstrue privacy as protected through copyright as 
having constitutional proportions. 
 
A. Considering the Compatibility of Copyright and Privacy Theory 
 
The most commonly asserted justification for U.S. copyright law is the utilitarian theory, 
pursuant to which copyright law exists simply to incentivize creators to give the public access to 
their works.161  Copyright in the United States is therefore not generally seen as an end in itself.162  
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Rather, giving the public access to creative works is the desired end, and the grant of copyright is 
merely a means to achieve that end. 163   
Unlike copyright, however, privacy is seen as an end in and of itself.164  The theory behind 
this view of privacy is that all human beings are entitled to certain basic rights; among these is 
privacy.165  While no consensus exists as to the precise contours of this privacy right,166 it is widely 
asserted that it amounts to a “right to be let alone.”167  One interpretation of this concept is that the 
“right to be let alone” is the right to be free from disclosure of certain personal facts.168   
Bridging the gap between a copyright regime that is primarily a means by which to 
encourage creation and dissemination and a privacy regime that seeks to prevent the disclosure of 
certain private information will require more than an understanding of the primary normative 
arguments behind these doctrines.  Once one breaches the superficial arguments for why we grant 
copyright and protect privacy, the overlap in these regimes becomes more apparent.   
 
The Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”169  This clause is understood as a utilitarian authorization of intellectual 
property rights.170  More specifically, the Supreme Court has recently stated, “[e]vidence from the 
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founding . . . suggests that inducing dissemination . . . was viewed as an appropriate means to 
promote science.”171 While this utilitarian theory of copyright is the most popular theory justifying 
copyright,172 there is no question that courts and commentators alike also take seriously various 
alternative theories.  Chief among these are labor theory173 and personhood theory.174  These 
alternative theories merit additional discussion because although neither is suggested by the 
Constitution both arise in U.S. copyright cases and may help to bridge the gap between the 
normative bases for copyright and privacy. 
 
The labor theory of copyright is based upon John Locke’s now notorious proclamation that 
“[t]hough the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property 
in his own person, this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour [sic] of his body, and the 
work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”175  This proclamation, as applied to copyright, 
suggests that while ideas should be “free to common use,”176 an author’s work embodied in her 
particular expression of those ideas is worthy of copyright protection.177   
 
While it was widely believed that the Supreme Court’s decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone 
Co.178 undercut labor theory as a viable basis for copyright protection in the United States,179 the 
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(citing Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)). 
175 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689).  
176 International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 218, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
177 Hughes, supra note 173, at 314 (“The courts’ ad hoc approach in this area suggests that copyrightability may be 
based as much on what we feel are people's deserts as on what we feel are society's informational needs. It has been 
said that the idea/expression issue is uniquely well-suited for juries. I suggest that this is so not because juries care 
about a doctrine that ameliorates copyright and first amendment tensions and not because they know what idea-
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178 Feist v. Rural Telephone Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
179 Adam Mossoff, Saving Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of Value in Intellectual Property Theory, 29 SOCIAL 
PHIL. & POL’Y 283, 293 (2012) (“intellectual property scholars widely believe that Feist represents an unequivocal 




court’s recent decision in Golan v. Holder180 has arguably reinvigorated this theory.181  In Golan, 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, noted that the legislation in question “gives [copyright 
owners] nothing more than the benefit of their labors during whatever time remains before the 
normal copyright term expires.”182  Justice Breyer, dissenting in Golan, took particular issue with 
this statement, stating, “insofar as [the majority decision] suggests that copyright should in general 
help authors obtain greater monetary rewards than needed to elicit new works, it rests upon 
primarily European, but not American, copyright concepts.”183  Notwithstanding Justice Breyer’s 
dismissal, labor theory has long been influential in American copyright.184  The majority decision 
in Golan suggests that influence persists.185 
 
Personhood theory, which is related to labor theory,186 suggests that policymakers ought to 
consider the extent to which copyright allows for the fulfillment of basic human needs.187  Among 
these basic needs are autonomy and self-realization.188  Many scholars have asserted that moral 
rights serve this personhood protective function in other countries.189  While the U.S. has largely 
been skeptical of moral rights in general, the rights of attribution and integrity have been partially 
codified in American law by way of the Visual Artists Rights Act.190 
 
In some sense, the fault line between utilitarian theories and natural rights theories is the 
distinct focus of each.  Utilitarian theories focus on the benefits that accrue to the public while 
natural rights theories are concerned with the rights that vest in the copyright owner.  Many see 
policy choices in copyright law as exclusively in line with either utilitarian theories or natural 
rights theories.191  However, this is a false dichotomy.  Rather, these theories actually operate in 
tandem.  Instead of seeking to confer rights upon authors or to bring about a public benefit, policy 
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makers tend to seek to strike the appropriate balance between these.192  The policy question, then 
should be, what types of proprietary rights incentivize the optimal amount of creation and 
dissemination?193 
 
Understanding which theories are at work in individual cases becomes a bit more 
complicated.  Despite the fact that the United States has repeatedly eschewed protection of moral 
rights, when examining individual cases it is apparent that personhood theory is, in fact, 
operative.194  Courts, by and large, take seriously the argument that authors may have a relationship 
to their works that is not proprietary but, rather, dignitary.195 
 
Just as it is necessary to go beyond the most obvious justification for copyright in order to 
fully understand how copyright and privacy may be reconciled, it is also essential to consider more 
than just the primary privacy theory.  Since the concept of privacy was initially introduced in 
American legal scholarship, privacy scholars have historically argued from the perspective of 
individual rights.196  In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis stated: 
 
[T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through 
the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, 
is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual 
to be let alone. . . . The principle which protects personal writings and all other 
personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against 
publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that 
of an inviolate personality.197 
 
Much of privacy scholarship has accepted this individually focused theory as sufficient to support 
privacy rights.198 
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However some contemporary privacy scholars are engaged in considering alternate bases 
for privacy protection.199  For example, Neil Richards, in his 2015 book, Intellectual Privacy,200 
argues that there are utilitarian reasons to protect privacy.201  Richards suggests that idea formation 
requires intellectual privacy.202  Privacy, he argues, allows for the freedom of thought that is 
necessary for the creation of works of authorship.203  In this way, he harmonizes the First 
Amendment with privacy protection insofar as the end result is free expression.204  
  
Since Richards is primarily focused upon articulating an alternative to the asserted conflict 
between privacy and the First Amendment, he focuses upon the role idea formation plays in 
political discourse.205  There is no doubt that the expression of ideas, assuming originality and 
fixation, ordinarily results in the creation of copyrightable content.  The argument that privacy is 
a necessary precursor to the creation of intellectual works has long been present in copyright cases 
and scholarship.206  
 
If one considers merely the most proffered bases for copyright and privacy, it is difficult 
to see how these two can be reconciled.  However, once you scratch the surface, it becomes clear 
that the cases for copyright and privacy have quite a bit in common.  Utilitarian and natural rights 
theories are present in both copyright and privacy jurisprudence and scholarship.  Moreover, both 
of these regimes argue for personal rights in the service of utilitarian ends.  Recent privacy 
scholarship suggests that the utilitarian ends of copyright and privacy are, in fact, overlapping.  
The protection of privacy creates a space where people can think freely which allows for idea 
formation that enhances both our public discourse and, ultimately, the public domain. 
 
Given the capacity to harmonize the theoretical underpinnings of privacy and copyright, 
the connection of these concepts in the case law is no surprise. In fact, in first articulating the right 
to privacy, Warren and Brandeis relied heavily on copyright concepts. Immediately following is 
an exposition of copyright’s role in the development of the idea of the right to privacy. 
B. Copyright and Privacy Through the Ages 
i. The Historical Connection: From the Common Law Right of First 
Publication to Copyright Preemption 
 
Until the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976, protection of works of authorship was 
bifurcated:  before publication, the work was protected by common law copyright, or the right of 
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first publication.207  After publication, the work was protected by statute, assuming that the 
statutory requirements were met.208  Common law copyright protected the author’s right to decide 
when and if the work was communicated to the public.209  There is a general consensus that the 
right of first publication lasted only until the work was published.210  Scholars and courts also 
agree that the common law right of first publication was more comprehensive than the statutory 
copyright.211   
 
 The common law copyright is sometimes characterized as control over the physical copy 
of the work.212  Other scholars consider the right of first publication as the right of market entry.213  
Still others regard it as primarily protective of privacy.214  Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis took 
the argument that common law copyright served to protect privacy a step further by arguing that 
it had the capacity to protect the privacy of persons other than authors; specifically, the subjects of 
creative works.  In fact, their argument that the right of privacy was already present in the common 
law in 1890 was largely based on the right of first publication.215  They stated, “the legal doctrines 
relating to infractions of what is ordinarily termed the common-law right to intellectual and artistic 
property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a general right to privacy, which 
properly understood afford a remedy for the evils under consideration.”216   
 
The Copyright Act of 1976 specifically preempts state and common law protections.217  As 
such, any protection of privacy that copyright is supposed to provide must be located somewhere 
in the statutory language of the Copyright Act.  Those who have considered whether the language 
of the Act supports privacy protections have concluded that the publication right in Section 106 of 
the Copyright Act subsumes the common law right of first publication.218  Because of the historical 
relationship between the right of first publication and privacy, commentators have located the 
current Act’s protection of privacy in the publication right contained in Section 106.219  However, 
the rights delineated in Section 106 are not limited in any way to the author.  Instead, they are 
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specifically deemed to be fully alienable by the statute.220  The next section of this article reflects 
on cases in which courts have recognized privacy interests in copyright infringement cases. 
ii. From Harper & Row to Salinger v. Colting:  Deploying the “Right Not to 
Speak” in Copyright Infringement Cases 
 
2015 marked thirty years since the Supreme Court decided Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enterprises,221 in which it held that The Nation Magazine had infringed the copyright in 
Gerald Ford’s memoir by publishing an article featuring excerpts of some 300 words.222  In so 
holding, the Court brought together concepts of privacy, first publication, and the right not to speak 
in the context of a copyright infringement suit.223  
     
The Supreme Court was faced with Harper & Row just eight years after it decided 
Wooley.224 The Nation Magazine argued that its publication of the article excerpting Nixon’s 
autobiography fell within the scope of the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press.225  
In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court relied upon Wooley to declare that a copyright owner 
has a right not to speak.226  In addition to Wooley, the Supreme Court cited a number of lower court 
decisions including Schnapper v. Foley227 and Estate of Hemingway v. Random House.228   
 
In Schnapper, the D.C. Circuit relied upon the right not to speak to hold that the First 
Amendment did not require the court to issue a compulsory license allowing for the use of the 
copyrighted works.229  The Court said, “[w]e see no reason why the same freedom [i.e., the right 
not to speak] should not be granted to the unwilling speaker when it is a public television station.  
There is no question but that these non-commercial broadcasters are fully protected by the First 
Amendment.”230  Schnapper is an interesting case because, like Harper & Row and Salinger v. 
Colting,231 the allegedly infringed works were already published.  Therefore, the works would not 
have been protected by common law copyright before the implementation of the 1976 Act.  Yet, 
the Court still extended protection to those works by reference to the Constitution.  Setting aside 
the lack of state action in Schnapper, the application of the common law copyright bolstered by 
the right not to speak seems incongruous in this context because the works in question had already 
been published.232 
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In the case involving Hemingway’s estate, however, the plaintiff apparently sought to stop 
dissemination of previously unpublished communications.233  As such, the use of common law 
copyright and, perhaps even the right not to speak, seems more appropriate.234  It is worth noting, 
however, that Hemingway was already deceased at the time of the suit.235  The statutory protection 
of the right to privacy in New York has always been limited to living persons, 236 which makes the 
attempt to protect Hemingway’s right to privacy rather odd.237  The attempt to interpose copyright 
to accomplish an end that the tort of invasion of privacy simply could not is deeply problematic.  
In any event, imbuing that privacy interest with constitutional aspects simply lacks any support in 
the privacy jurisprudence or copyright law. 
 
The Harper & Row Court’s characterization of privacy interests as embodied in the right 
of first publication and protected by reference to the “right not to speak” was initially read as a 
near prohibition on the fair use of unpublished works.238  Rejecting The Nation’s argument that it 
could make a fair use of material the author had demonstrated an intent to publish, the Court stated, 
“[t]his argument assumes that the unpublished nature of copyrighted material is only relevant to 
letters or other confidential writings not intended for dissemination.  It is true that common-law 
copyright was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy.”239  The Court then went on to 
qualify that statement saying, “[i]n its commercial guise, however, an author's right to choose when 
he will publish is no less deserving of protection.”240  The Court then upped the ante on protection 
by invoking the right not to speak: 
 
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on 
the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or 
publish when others wish him to be quiet.  There is necessarily, and within suitably 
defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the 
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.  Courts and 
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commentators have recognized that copyright, and the right of first publication in 
particular, serve this countervailing First Amendment value.241 
 
The right not to speak was largely a dead letter within the context of copyright infringement 
litigation for more than twenty years, but experienced a resurgence in the Second Circuit’s 2010 
decision in Salinger v. Colting.242  The Salinger Court, in deciding whether to reverse the district 
court’s grant of preliminary injunctive relief, asserted infringement of the copyright owner’s right 
not to speak in support of a finding of irreparable harm.243  The Court stated: 
 
Next, the court must consider whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in 
the absence of a preliminary injunction, and the court must assess the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant.  Those two items, both of which 
consider the harm to the parties, are related.  The relevant harm is the harm that (a) 
occurs to the parties' legal interests and (b) cannot be remedied after a final 
adjudication, whether by damages or a permanent injunction.  The plaintiff's 
interest is, principally, a property interest in the copyrighted material.  But as the 
Supreme Court has suggested, a copyright holder might also have a First 
Amendment interest in not speaking.244 
 
The Salinger Court went on to say:  “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, and hence 
infringement of the right not to speak, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.”245  Given that the Salinger decision is the first Second Circuit 
decision applying eBay in the context of preliminary injunctive relief in a copyright infringement 
suit,246 it seems likely that the deployment of the right not to speak to establish irreparable harm 
will become more common.  In fact, litigants in another jurisdiction have already advanced this 
argument.247  In Bollea, the plaintiff employed this argument in the context of what was very 
obviously a privacy case.248  So far, however, it appears that the right not to speak argument has 
only succeeded in lower courts in the Second Circuit.249 
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In Bond v. Blum,250 the Fourth Circuit unequivocally stated: 
 
[T]he protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright law.  To the contrary, 
the copyright law offers a limited monopoly to encourage ultimate public access to 
the creative work of the author.  If privacy is the essence of [Plaintiff]'s claim, then 
his action must lie in some common-law right to privacy, not in the Copyright 
Act.”251   
 
More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, citing Bond approvingly, 
disallowed injunctive relief where, “[t]he main concern proffered by Plaintiff—the concern that 
spurred this litigation—well before Plaintiff obtained his purported ownership of a copyright in 
the Video — is that the ‘private’ Video portrays him in poor light and in an embarrassing 
fashion.”252  On the other hand, cases conducting fair use analyses of unpublished works do 
consider the copyright owner’s asserted privacy interests.253  Given this split in authority, it is 
unclear to what extent common law privacy protection survived the adoption of the 1976 Act.  
 
Whatever privacy interest was protected by common law copyright prior to the adoption 
of the 1976 Act, it was not an interest, when properly understood, that rises to constitutional 
proportions.  As such, the deployment of the right not to speak to protect any such privacy right is 
out of line with copyright norms, privacy norms, and jurisprudence.  The next section of this article 
considers recent cases in which plaintiffs attempted to deploy copyright to protect against harms 
ordinarily understood as invasions of privacy. 
C. The Problems Posed by Protecting Privacy Through Copyright 
 
Pamela Samuelson has suggested that several recent cases raise the question of “whether 
copyright has recently become, at least in some instances, a more effective way to protect privacy 
interests than privacy law alone would allow.”254   In considering this question, Samuelson has 
presented four vastly different cases that question whether copyright may be utilized to halt 
dissemination of a work.255  While the four cases diverge factually, they bear striking similarities 
that demonstrate the problems that may result from protecting privacy through copyright.  These 
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issues primarily stem from two challenges.  The first is differentiating between authorship and 
copyright ownership. Second, courts must consider First Amendment protection issues raised in 
the context of copyright infringement suits.  What follows immediately is a discussion of these 
two issues. 
 
i. The Subject / Author / Copyright Owner Conundrum 
 
Distinguishing between the party protected by the right to privacy and the party protected 
by copyright is a problem that has existed since the right to privacy was first articulated.  The Right 
to Privacy is clearly focused on the privacy of the subject of photographs and newspaper articles:   
 
The right of one who has remained a private individual, to prevent his public 
portraiture, presents the simplest case for . . . extension [of a cause of action for 
invasion of privacy] . . . .   If casual and unimportant statements in a letter, if 
handiwork, however inartistic and valueless, if possessions of all sorts are protected 
not only against reproduction, but against description and enumeration, how much 
more should the acts and sayings of a man in his social and domestic relations be 
guarded from ruthless publicity.256 
Interestingly, Warren and Brandeis clearly understood that the existing common law right of first 
publication inhered in authors rather than subjects: 
 
The aim of those [copyright] statutes is to secure to the author, composer, or artist 
the entire profits arising from publication; but the common-law protection enables 
him to control absolutely the act of publication, and in the exercise of his own 
discretion, to decide whether there shall be any publication at all.257   
 
Moreover, Warren and Brandeis published The Right to Privacy six years after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony.258  In this landmark case, the Court 
held that photographs are copyrightable content and that the owner of the copyright was the 
photographer.259  The decision established that any copyright in photographs would belong to the 
photographer rather than the subject of the photograph.260  Yet, Warren and Brandeis never 
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mention this decision or seek to reconcile its holding with their assertion that common law 
copyright provides precedent for the protection of the privacy of the subjects of photographs.261 
 
Recent attempts to protect privacy by way of the 1976 Copyright Act demonstrate a similar 
difficulty in determining whose privacy is being protected. In fact, recent cases complicate this 
matter by adding the copyright owner as a potential party whose privacy interests can be asserted 
through a claim of copyright infringement, even if the owner is not the author or the subject of the 
work.262  Warren and Brandeis’ argument that the privacy of subjects of copyrightable content 
deserves protection has, of course, won the day.263   
 
This misfit of copyright law to remedy privacy harms is evident in the cases Samuelson 
has highlighted.  In two of the cases, the authors of the asserted works are not parties to the suit.264  
In Balsley, the plaintiff purchased the copyright from the author (in this case, the photographer);265 
and in Monge, it is entirely unclear whether the plaintiffs had a copyright interest in the works in 
question at all.266  The Monge Court relied upon registration certificates produced by the plaintiff 
and declined to “express [an] opinion as to the ownership of copyright regarding the sixth photo 
[or] . . . as to the ultimate copyright status of any of the photos.”267  Samuelson has speculated, 
“Monge must have purchased the copyrights in order to bring the lawsuit.”268  Unfortunately, 
nothing in the opinion definitively answers whether the plaintiffs actually owned the copyrights in 
question.   
 
Likewise, in Garcia v. Google, Inc.,269 one of the primary points of contention between the 
majority and dissenting opinions was whether the plaintiff could properly be described as an author 
protected by the 1976 Copyright Act.270  Disagreement regarding authorship and copyright 
ownership, as was seen in the two opinions, is ultimately caused by the difficult fit between the 
Copyright Act and the protection of privacy interests.  This is because copyright subsists initially 
in the author (as opposed to the subject) of a work.271  The author may of course alienate her 
interest in the work however she sees fit.272  However, once an author parts with her interest in the 
work, it is the copyright owner, as opposed to the author or subject, who is protected by the 
Copyright Act.273  Given the full alienability of copyright interests, privacy protection for the 
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subject of a work through the Copyright Act is complicated even further.  A brief foray into the 
facts of Balsley v. LFP, Inc. will more fully demonstrate these difficulties. 
 
In Balsley, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the defendant was entitled to a reversal of 
the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury had rendered a 
verdict of copyright infringement.274  In March 2003, the plaintiff, Catherine Balsley, was 
photographed in various states of undress as she participated in a wet tee shirt contest at a bar in 
Florida.275  The photographer, Gontran Durocher, posted the photographs of Balsley on 
lenshead.com.276  In 2004, Balsley obtained and registered the copyrights in the photos taken by 
Durocher.277  In 2005, a reader of the magazine nominated Balsley for Hustler Magazine’s “Hot 
News Babes” contest.278  Employees of the magazine located the photos online and published one 
of them in the February 2006 edition of Hustler Magazine.279  Balsley learned of the publication 
of the photograph and sued, alleging copyright infringement and violation of Ohio’s right of 
publicity statute and common law right of privacy, among other claims.280  The only claim 
ultimately tried was the claim of copyright infringement, on which the jury found for the plaintiff 
and awarded damages in the amount of $135,000.281  The defendant moved for judgment as a 
matter of law on the issue of fair use and then appealed the trial court’s denial of that motion.282 
 
One of the most interesting things about Balsley is that the “Plaintiffs sought ownership of 
the photographs so that they would have a legal means of ending the photographs' dissemination.  
They negotiated with Durocher, who sold, transferred, and assigned all rights, title, and interest in 
the copyright to the photographs to Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs then registered their acquired copyright 
with the United States Copyright Office.”283  What this means, of course, is that in order to be in 
a position to use the Copyright Act to “end the photographs’ dissemination” Balsley had to 
negotiate with Durocher who, at least arguably, was himself responsible for a significant incursion 
upon Balsley’s right to privacy.284  Note that as the subject of the photograph, Balsley had no 
protectable copyright interest in the picture.  Rather, that interest arose in Durocher, who took the 
picture and was responsible for its initial online dissemination.  A system that requires Balsley to 
negotiate with Durocher as a prerequisite to properly protecting her privacy interests seems bizarre 
to say the least.  
 
The problem of using copyright to protect the privacy interests of subjects has inhered in 
privacy theory since its inception, when Warren and Brandeis avoided the ambiguity between 
author and subject in their initial exposition of the right to privacy. The move to locate the privacy 
protection previously understood as provided for by common law copyright within a statutory 
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provision providing rights that are fully alienable further complicates matters by adding the 
copyright owner to the author and subject as persons potentially seeking to enforce the right. But, 
that isn’t the only problem presented by seeking to use copyright to protect privacy. Doing so also 
raises real First Amendment concerns.   
 
ii. The Problem of Constitutional Privacy Rights in Tort Privacy 
Circumstances 
 
Samuelson posits that copyright infringement claims are attractive to litigants seeking to 
stem the dissemination of particular works, at least in part, “because of . . . the inhospitable 
reception courts have had to First Amendment defenses in copyright cases.”285 In three of the four 
cases Samuelson describes, in addition to the copyright infringement claim(s), the plaintiffs 
asserted claims for either infringement of the right to privacy or the right of publicity.286  In Hill, 
while the copyright infringement action proceeded, the right of publicity claim was dismissed due 
to a perceived conflict with the First Amendment.287  In Balsley, the Court granted the defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment as to the right to privacy and right of publicity claims.288  The trial 
court in Monge dismissed the misappropriation claim and granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant on the issue of fair use.289  The plaintiffs only appealed the fair use holding.290  What 
all of these outcomes demonstrate is that copyright infringement allegations are more likely to 
hold up for a plaintiff than are right to privacy or right of publicity claims.  This helps to explain 
why one seeking to stop the dissemination of a particular work might opt to proceed under 
copyright in addition to any extant privacy causes of action.   While a cursory examination of these 
cases demonstrates the validity of Samuelson’s insight, closer analysis also reveals some of the 
potential hazards that may arise when one whose privacy interest is endangered by dissemination 
of a work proceeds under copyright. 
 
The protection of privacy interests through the copyright statute creates some troubling 
First Amendment conundrums.  As the immediately preceding discussion makes clear, plaintiffs 
who cannot proceed under privacy protections without running afoul of the First Amendment are 
able to circumvent the First Amendment by acquiring the copyright in the works at issue.  This 
ought to concern policy makers considering the usefulness of copyright as a privacy protection 
mechanism.  The Supreme Court simply got this wrong in Harper & Row.291  Courts making these 
determinations now ought to refuse to perpetuate that reasoning.  What follows immediately are 
some modest suggestions for alternative paths forward. 
                                                          
285 Samuelson, supra note 21, at 198. 
286 Balsley, 691 F.3d at 756 (claiming infringement of both the common law right of privacy and the statutory right 
of publicity); Hill v. Public Advocate of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1351 (D. Colo. 2014) (asserting claims of 
both copyright infringement and the Colorado state tort of appropriation of name or likeness); Monge v. Maya 
Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]sserting claims for copyright infringement, statutory 
misappropriation of likeness, and common law misappropriation of likeness.”). 
287 Hill, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 1357 (“use of [Plaintiffs’] name and likeness was primarily noncommercial and that it 
reasonably relates to a legitimate matter of public concern. As such, the First Amendment privilege bars the . . . 
claim for appropriation of name or likeness and that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”). 
288 Balsley, 691 F.3d at 756. 
289 Monge, 688 F.3d at 1170. 
290 Id. 




D. Potential Legislative Solutions 
 
 The Supreme Court’s deployment of the right not to speak to protect the asserted interests of 
President Ford in Harper & Row v. The Nation,292 as relied upon by the Second Circuit in 
Salinger v. Colting,293 epitomizes the worst-case scenario that results when Courts utilize 
copyright to protect privacy interests.  Protecting privacy interests by reference to the existing 
common law paradigm is superior to utilizing the Copyright Act and suggesting that 
constitutional privacy interests are somehow implicated.  This is because traversing the copyright 
route could potentially fail to protect the subject of the work and presents serious First 
Amendment concerns.294  Of course, this leaves privacy plaintiffs without any remedy akin to the 
takedown procedure the DMCA provides.295 It also, arguably, fails to recognize the privacy 
protection provided to authors by way of the common law right of first publication.  What 
follows is a brief consideration of some potential legislative actions that may address those 
issues.   
  
i. A Federal Privacy Statute for the Internet 
 
Protecting privacy on the internet is imperative.296  The Ashley Madison leak demonstrates 
the very real need for a mechanism like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s takedown 
procedure to enable privacy victims to have an immediate remedy.  Although federal legislation 
to protect individuals from online privacy violations has been proposed a number of times,297 
currently, there does not appear to be political will to pass such legislation.  Moreover, the 
proposed bills have been criticized for being both too narrow and toothless.298  Given the privacy 
plaintiff’s propensity to use the Copyright Act as a mechanism to alleviate invasions of privacy, 
the remedies provided for in the Copyright Act may provide a model for the type of remedy that 
could be effective in protecting privacy online.   
 
Of course, any such remedy must be sensitive to the potential First Amendment 
implications of removing content at the behest of a person who is depicted in it.  Specifically, the 
challenge will be articulating the class of content that, if objected to by the subject, is private.  
Matters of public record, such as the marriage of the plaintiffs in Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc.299 
are very plainly excluded from common law privacy protection and ought to be excluded from any 
federal statutory protection as well.  The more difficult line drawing will have to take place in 
considering what matter is private on its face.  This is so because a matter that is considered private 
for a non-public figure, may be considered public for a public figure.  Moreover, the law has long 
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recognized that an individual may be a limited-purpose public figure if she finds herself embroiled 
in a matter of public concern.   
 
Parsing these distinctions has, of course, proven difficult for courts and commentators 
addressing privacy claims. Legislating in this area on the federal level poses the same difficulties 
and presents additional difficulties by asking internet service providers to engage in exceedingly 
difficult decision-making.  We have already seen the difficulties associated with fair use and, by 
extension, First Amendment questions in the context of the DMCA.  That said, if we value privacy 
interests at least as much as we do copyright interests, it makes sense to attempt such legislative 
reform despite the associated difficulties.  Likewise, if we are committed to the common law 
principle of protecting authors’ privacy (as opposed to the privacy of subjects), we ought to 
consider doing so transparently by adopting the moral right of disclosure. 
ii. Amending the Copyright Act to Limit Privacy Claims by Adopting the Moral 
Right of Disclosure 
 
Under the common law, the right of first publication inhered in the author.300  No subject 
had any interest in the work or any right to allow for or restrict dissemination.301  The right of first 
publication expired upon the authorized publication of the work.302  The right of first publication 
was viewed as a protection of authorial privacy, so the choice to publish effectively waived any 
privacy concerns.303  The move to protect privacy through federal statute failed to account for the 
alienability of the rights represented in the Copyright Act of 1976.304  As such, what was 
constituted as protection for authorial privacy under the common law has now morphed into an 
unrecognizable and unjustifiable right that may be asserted regardless of the identity of the person 
asserting it.  This is entirely out of line with both the common law copyright and the right to privacy 
jurisprudence.  If, in undertaking a wholesale revision of the Copyright Act, it is deemed 
appropriate to protect the privacy of authors as the common law had done, the simplest mechanism 
for doing so may be to statutorily adopt the moral right of disclosure which “recognizes the author 




Returning to where this paper began, what Ashley Madison ultimately needed was a 
particular, enforceable remedy to remove its subscribers’ personal information from the internet.  
In seeking to fulfill that need, Avid, the owner of the Ashley Madison website, reached for the 
regulatory scheme best equipped to provide the desired result—the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act.  As contemporaneous commentators noted, it is entirely plausible that the content in question 
was not copyrightable in the first place.  Even if it was, there was at least a colorable argument 
that Avid was not the author or copyright owner of the content.  In this article I have argued that 
even if copyright can be contorted to cover a case like the Ashley Madison case, perhaps it should 
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not.  This contortion has the potential to create both doctrinal and practical problems, including, 
most notably, providing perverse incentives to copyright owners to threaten to post content to the 
internet unless the subject pays up.   
Note, though, that suggesting that copyright does not provide a remedy in situations like 
this is not meant to suggest that no remedy ought to be available.  Rather, this article suggests that 
the appropriate paradigm for considering such a remedy is a federal privacy statute that provides 
a takedown mechanism analogous to the one provided in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  
It would, of course, be entirely appropriate for such a paradigm to import the free speech and 
freedom of the press protections already present in the common law of privacy.  As for providing 
copyright owners with the right of first publication that inhered in the common law long before 
the passage of the current Copyright Act, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, as many other 
countries already protect an author’s moral right of disclosure.  As Congress begins to develop the 
next great copyright act, it might do well to consider whether statutorily adopting such a right 
would be appropriate. 
 
